Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Rules
This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.
Year of publication: |
2006-03
|
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Authors: | Takamiya, Koji ; Tanaka, Akira |
Institutions: | Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University |
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