Concentration horizontale et relations verticales
This paper studies horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. In atwo-level Cournot model, with an intermediate and a final market, we show thatdownstream mergers inducing size effects are, ceteris paribus, more profitablethan upstream ones. Moreover, a merger at one level reduces the incentivesto merge at the other level. Endogenizing the firms’ decisions to merge byconsidering a merger game supports the previous results.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Allain, Marie-Laure ; Souam, Saïd |
Institutions: | Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST), Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique (GENES) |
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