Concession Behavior in a Bargaining Game
This article reports on an experiment concerned with a two-stage, two-person, simultaneous-demand bargaining game. The focus of analysis is on a prediction for concession behavior in the second-stage game provided by Harsanyi's “risk dominance†principle, which is at odds with the prediction provided by the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the second-stage game. The results of the experiment provide support for the risk dominance prediction, with concessions occurring according to the prediction in 78% of eligible cases, thus outperforming the mixed-strategy equilibrium as a predictor of concession behavior.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Sopher, Barry |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 38.1994, 1, p. 117-137
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Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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