Concurrence et biens publics
I discuss the extent to which the theory of local public goods and clubs is an extension of competitive theory. To do this I reinterpret efficiency results in the literature as arising from optimization against a complete price system. For clubs I give a framework to unify club economies with anonymous and nonanonymous crowding. Competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the equal-treatment core, and core payoffs satisfy a monotonicity property: An increase in the number of one type of player will reduce their core payoff. When the partition of the population is constrained by fixed geographic boundaries, efficiency is second-best. A complete price system can be used to describe capitalization, and optimization relative to this price system leads to second-best efficiency. For both branches of the literature I offer criticisms of the price systems and equilibrium concepts.
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | SCOTCHMER, Suzanne |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1994, 33, p. 157-186
|
Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Risk taking and gender in hierarchies
Scotchmer, Suzanne, (2008)
-
Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
Jéhiel, Philippe, (1998)
-
Diamantaras, Dimitrios, (1994)
- More ...