Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Velez, Rodrigo A. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 56.2014, 1, p. 125-156
|
Subject: | Hierarchical exchange rules | Consistent hierarchical exchange rules | Consistency | Strategy-proofness | Group strategy-proofness | Reallocation-proofness | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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