Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Kirstein, Roland ; Voigt, Stefan |
Publisher: |
Saarbrücken : Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |
Subject: | Self-enforcing contracts | Rule of law | dictatorship | autocracy | Positive Constitutional Economics |
Series: | CSLE Discussion Paper ; 99-04 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 503150142 [GVK] hdl:10419/23057 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:csledp:9904 [RePEc] |
Classification: | H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
-
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts
Kirstein, Roland, (2000)
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Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics
Kirstein, Roland, (1999)
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The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts
Kirstein, Roland, (2000)
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The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts
Kirstein, Roland, (2000)
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The violent and the weak : when dictators care about social contracts
Kirstein, Roland, (2006)
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Constitutions as equilibria : a game-theoretic approach to positive constitutional economics
Kirstein, Roland, (1999)
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