Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights.
This paper examines interaction in the absence of property rights when agents face a trade-off between productive and coercive activities. In this setting, conflict is not the necessary outcome of one-time interaction and cooperation is consistent with domination of one agent over another. Other things being equal, an agent's power, a well-defined concept in this paper, is inversely related to an agent's resources when resources are valued according to marginal-productivity theory. Some implications for the evolution of property rights are drawn. The model is applicable to a variety of situations in which directly unproductive activities are prevalent. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Skaperdas, Stergios |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 82.1992, 4, p. 720-39
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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