Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock
A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock is developed to investigate the economic benefits that can be realized from the resource, and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainability under cooperation and non-cooperation. The two agents are identified in this study as a trawl fishery versus a coastal fishery. Unlike in Munro (1979), where conflicts in the management strategies of agents arise from differences in the perceptions of the discount factor, fishing effort costs, and consumer preferences, here conflicts arise mainly from the differences in fishing gear and grounds, and the age group of cod targeted by the two agents. Using a game theoretic framework, we show that given available data, the optimum optimorum is obtained under cooperation with side payments and no predetermined harvest shares, in which case the coastal fishery buys out the trawl fishery. However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the price premium assumed for mature cod is taken away, the trawl fishery takes over as the producer of the optimum optimorum. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sumaila, Ussif |
Published in: |
Environmental & Resource Economics. - European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, ISSN 0924-6460. - Vol. 10.1997, 2, p. 147-165
|
Publisher: |
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists |
Subject: | game theory | cooperative | non-cooperative | fishery resources | coastal vessels | cod | trawlers | Norway |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by subject
-
Cannibalism and the optimal sharing of the North-East Atlantic cod stock : a computation model
Armstrong, Claire W., (1997)
-
Yang, Chih-Te, (2018)
-
Bao, Binshuo, (2020)
- More ...
Similar items by person