Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation
In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation. I.e., the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.
Year of publication: |
1993-09
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Authors: | Moldovanu, Benny ; Winter, Eyal |
Institutions: | University of Bonn, Germany |
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