Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
Year of publication: |
March 2016
|
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Authors: | Hillas, John ; Liu, Min |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 45.2016, 1/2, p. 137-153
|
Subject: | Two player repeated games | Imperfect monitoring | Stochastic signals | Correlated equilibrium | Signalling | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Korrelation | Correlation | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory |
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