Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests its predictions. The model provides conditions for the existence of credit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seem to be good approximations of the experimental results.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999-01
Authors:	Bosch-Domènech, Antoni ; Sáez, María
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Subject:	Cycles \| evolutionary dynamics \| games \| experiments \| Leex

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572593