Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game

Traditional game theoretic analysis proposes backward induction as a model of rational behaviour in games with perfect information. However, counterintuitive results have cast doubt on the predictive power of the theory. For example, in the Centipede Game, experimental evidence shows that subjects' behavior significatively differs from what the theory expects. In our paper, we construct a dynamic model based on the Centipede Game.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Ponti, G.B
Subject:	LEARNING \| GAMES \| DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245531