Debt and Creative Destruction: Why Could Subsidizing Corporate Debt be Optimal?
Year of publication: |
2012-03
|
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Authors: | He, Zhiguo ; Matvos, Gregor |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | CF IO PE Number 17920 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies |
Source: |
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