Decentralization of Economic Law - an Oxymoron

The interest in decentralizing governance increases worldwide. In Europe too, a policy of decentralization is being applied. In economic law, in both the cases of competition and financial services law, new rules are in the process of being introduced. In competition law, the Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition leads to a decentralized model of law enforcement. In financial services law, the new Directive on markets in financial instruments proposes the introduction of a four-level rule-making model, which may represent a participative, decentralized approach, but results in a centralization of that process, while the enforcement remains decentralized. This essay provides a brief overview of these models of regulation. Then, it examines these regulatory structures of governance mechanisms and focuses on the question of the impact of the decentralization process in the context of decentred understandings of regulation. It points to the paradox of law being decentralized where it is a centralized function and thus representing an oxymoron. The paper argues that decentralization results in an oxymoron depending on the function of law considered. The overall purpose of the paper is to contribute to a better understanding of governance through decentralization