Designing Multi-unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent-based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions
Multi-unit auctions are being used by public agencies to allocate resources and to purchase services. These auctions resolve the lumpy bid problem inherent in single-bid auctions by allowing bidders to submit a supply or demand schedule. However, the choice of pricing formats for multi-unit auctions is controversial. Neither economic theory nor laboratory experiments depict a complete picture of how alternative pricing formats perform in terms of budgetary or allocative efficiency. This paper constructs an agent-based computational model to compare uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey pricing formats under different degrees of competition and heterogeneity in the bidder population. Copyright © 2007 The Economic Society of Australia.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | HAILU, ATAKELTY ; THOYER, SOPHIE |
Published in: |
The Economic Record. - Economic Society of Australia - ESA, ISSN 1475-4932. - Vol. 83.2007, s1, p. 57-57
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Publisher: |
Economic Society of Australia - ESA |
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