Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | LANGLAIS, Eric |
Institutions: | EconomiX, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense (Paris X) |
Subject: | Criminal teams | corporate criminality | state dependent risk aversion | deterrence | monetary penalties versus detection |
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