Die Zeitpräferenz der Zentralbank als strategische Handlungsalternative bei der Ausgestaltung von Geldpolitikmustern im Reputationsgleichgewicht
In the present paper a Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy with asymmetric information is considered. Since monetary policy formation is an ongoing process with repeated interactions between the central bank and the private sector, game-theoretic methodology is the appropriate tool to analyse the problem of reputation as a repeated game. It is shown, that in a sequential equilibrium, which describes the policy actions, the time preference selection by the players has an important influence on the development of the real economy.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Bieta, Volker |
Published in: |
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES). - Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES, ISSN 0303-9692. - Vol. 131.1995, II, p. 227-246
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Publisher: |
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES |
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