Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated 'queto' Game

We analyse a common value, alternating ascending bid, first price auction as a repeated game of incomplete information where the bidders hold equal property rights to the object auctioned off. Consequently they can accept (by quitting) or veto any proposed settlement. We characterise the essentially unique, sequentially rational dynamic Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game under incomplete information on one side and discuss its properties.

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Year of publication:	2003-05
Authors:	Schweinzer, Paul
Institutions:	Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Subject:	repeated games \| incomplete information \| common value auctions \| partnership dissolution

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	16 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D44 - Auctions ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596297