Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently.
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset. The valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. The authors characterize the set of all incentive- compatible and interim individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | Cramton, Peter ; Gibbons, Robert ; Klemperer, Paul |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 55.1987, 3, p. 615-32
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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