Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.
Year of publication: |
2006-07
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Authors: | Takamiya, Koji |
Institutions: | Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University |
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