Dynamic contracting with long-term consequences: Optimal CEO compensation and turnover
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Vasama, Suvi |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |
Subject: | Dynamic moral hazard | managerial turnover | pay for performance |
Series: | SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; 2016-044 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 87102375X [GVK] hdl:10419/148880 [Handle] RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-044 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: |
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Dynamic contracting with long-term consequences : optimal CEO compensation and turnover
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