Dynamic regulation design without payments: The importance of timing
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Boleslavsky, Raphael ; Kelly, David L. |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 120.2014, C, p. 169-180
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Optimal regulation | Limited transfers | Dynamic regulation |
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