Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality

Earmarking is a form of bundling in which government adopts a tax policy while specifying the uses of the revenue. This paper explores how bundling can enhance efficiency: it can inform the public of the quality of a program proposed, or of the quality of the agency that will be responsible for designing and implementing the program.We show that policies that appear inefficient in isolation may become justified when bundled.

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Year of publication:	2007-02
Authors:	Glazer, Amihai ; Proost, Stef
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine
Subject:	Earmarking \| Asymmetric information \| Bureaucracy \| Project evaluation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 060713 15 pages
Classification:	D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; H43 - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977972