Economic Efficiency of the Organizational Decisions of the Firm

1. The Firm and Its Organization -- 1.1. Market Exchange -- 1.2. Monopolistic Competition -- 1.3. Contractual Relations -- 1.4. Internal Organization -- 1.5. Organizational Design -- 1.6. Nature of the Study -- 2. Welfare and Inefficiency -- 2.1. The Managerial Milieu and Welfare -- 2.2. The Neoclassical Paradigm -- 2.3. The Baumol Firm -- 2.4. External Constraints and Fixed Costs -- 2.5. Discretionary Managerial Behavior -- 2.6. Managerial Inefficiency -- 3. Efficiency of Organizational Decisions -- 3.1. Organization and Welfare -- 3.2. Internal Pressure and Cost -- 3.3. External Pressure and Efficiency -- 3.4. Basic Model -- 3.5. Conditions for Organizational Efficiency -- 3.6. Emergence of Inefficiency -- 3.7. Conclusion -- 4. Quality of Products -- 4.1. The Issues -- 4.2. Durability of Products -- 4.3. Ex Post Demand as Standard -- 4.4. Demand for Quality -- 4.5. Quality Preference and Efficiency -- 4.6. Conclusion -- 5. Search Costs, Advertising and Welfare -- 5.1. The Issues -- 5.2. Conventional Wisdom -- 5.3. Search Costs -- 5.4. Efficiency of Advertising Revisited -- 5.5. Conclusion -- 6. Transaction Costs and Vertical Integration -- 6.1. Vertical Integration and Welfare -- 6.2. Internal and External Pressure -- 6.3. Costs and Efficient Integration -- 6.4. Conditions for Efficiency -- 6.5. Emergence of Inefficiency -- 6.6. Conclusion -- 7. Inventory Decisions -- 7.1. The Basis for Inventory Holding -- 7.2. Impact of Inventories on Welfare -- 7.3. Marginal Concepts -- 7.4. Welfare Maximization -- 7.5. Other Sources of Inefficiency -- 7.6. Multiperiod Generalization -- 7.7. In Retrospect -- 8. Hierarchical Organizations -- 8.1. A Change in Emphasis -- 8.2. Size and Organization -- 8.3. The Basic Model -- 8.4. Choice of the Firm Size -- 8.5. Compliance and Management -- 8.6. Conclusion -- 9. Information, Monitoring and Incentives -- 9.1. The Issues -- 9.2. Basic Response to Information Asymmetry -- 9.3. Welfare Maximization -- 9.4. Budgets and Contracting -- 9.5. Monitoring the Group -- 9.6. Incentives and Organizational Behavior -- 9.7. Conclusion -- 10. In Retrospect -- 10.1. Technical Inefficiency Revisited -- 10.2. Economic Inefficiency Revisited -- 10.3. Other Conceptual Problems.