Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
The authors examine a bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched and time is costly. They characterize efficiency and then, using an implementation approach, study the allocations that can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form. The authors are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary: buyers and sellers have the option of being rematched in the market. Finally, they compare and contrast the efficient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equilibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Jackson, Matthew O. ; Palfrey, Thomas R. |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 66.1998, 6, p. 1353-1388
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
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