Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian L. ; Kim, Jinwoo |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 31.2013, 5, p. 659-665
|
Subject: | Liquidity-constrained agents | Lottery | Random rationing | Resale | Cash subsidy | Optimal mechanism | Glücksspiel | Gambling | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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