Elastic Demand, Sunk Costs and the Kreps-Scheinkman Extension of the Cournot Model

The paper shows that, with any rationing mechanism between the efficient and proportional extremes, the Kreps-Scheinkman two-stage quantity-price game reduces to the Cournot model if demand is uniformly elastic and if all costs are sunk at the first stage, thus providing positive results to set against existing negative statements

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Madden, Paul
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217912