Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

We characterize the minmax values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-oﬀ for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoﬀs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are measured through the entropy function. Our theorem on minmax values stems from a more general characterization of optimal strategies for a class of optimization problems.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Tomala, Tristan
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	correlation \| optimization problem \| min-max values \| repeated games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Cahiers du Ceremade, 2003
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073610