Environmental policy as a multi-task principal-agent problem
Year of publication: |
2003-11
|
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Authors: | Franckx, Laurent ; D'Amato, Alessio |
Institutions: | Centrum voor Economische Studiƫn, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen |
Subject: | environmental regulation | multi-tasking |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | 20 pages |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K00 - Law and Economics. General ; Q28 - Government Policy |
Source: |
-
Multiple-task common agency with one fully-informed principal: implications for public policy
Franckx, Laurent, (2002)
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Nonpoint source pollution regulation when polluters might cooperate
Millock, Katrin, (1997)
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Vislie, Jon, (2003)
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Multiple-task common agency with one fully-informed principal: implications for public policy
Franckx, Laurent, (2002)
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Penalty and crime with lumpy choices: some further considerations
Franckx, Laurent, (2002)
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Reputation effects in regulatory enforcement
Franckx, Laurent, (2001)
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