Equilibrium Information Disclosure: Grade Inflation and Unraveling

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e. g. the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same amount of information is disclosed in all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the equilibrium amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Ostrovsky, Michael ; Schwarz, Michael
Institutions:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), Department of Economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1996
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478834