Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Binmore, Kenneth ; Samuelson, Larry ; Young, H. Peyton
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (60 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 21, 2003 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.394262 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014086939