Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information
Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63-91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another. Two weaker positive properties are formulated.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | de Clippel, Geoffroy |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 2, p. 265-267
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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