Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
This article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in Florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information. The main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data. The article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms, such as imposing limits on contingency fees and caps on jury awards.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Sieg, Holger |
Published in: |
Journal of Political Economy. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 108.2000, 5, p. 1006-1021
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
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