Executive Compensation in the Life Insurance Industry.
Alternative theories imply differential compensation levels between executives of mutual and stock insurance companies. Evidence from the life insurance industry indicates (1) the compensation of mutual executives is lower than that of stock executives, (2) the compensation of mutual-subsidiary executives is lower than that of stock-subsidiary executives, and (3) the compensation of mutual executives is less responsive to firm performance than that of stock executives. This evidence is consistent with the existence of differences in corporate investment opportunity sets and resulting differences in required managerial discretion between mutual and stock life insurance companies. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mayers, David ; Smith Jr., Clifford W |
Published in: |
The Journal of Business. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 65.1992, 1, p. 51-74
|
Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Death and Taxes: The Market for Flower Bonds.
Mayers, David, (1987)
-
Board Composition and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Insurance Industry.
Mayers, David, (1997)
-
On the Corporate Demand for Insurance.
Mayers, David, (1982)
- More ...