Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetric Bidders
For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and thus is unaffected by how tied bids are resolved.
Year of publication: |
2010-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Govindan, Srihari ; Wilson, Robert |
Institutions: | Graduate School of Business, Stanford University |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions
Govindan, Srihari, (2010)
-
Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values
Govindan, Srihari, (2010)
-
Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games
Govindan, Srihari, (2009)
- More ...