Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Daughety, Andrew F. ; Reinganum, Jennifer F. |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 7981314. - Vol. 35.2004, 3, p. 467-485
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