Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dütting, Paul ; Fischer, Felix ; Parkes, David C. |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0364-765X, ZDB-ID 195683-8. - Vol. 44.2019, 1, p. 196-211
|
Subject: | mechanism design | generalized first-price auction | profit target strategies | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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