Extremal Incentive Compatible Transfers
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Kos, Nenad ; Messner, Matthias |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Nutzenfunktion | Utility function | Einnahmen | Revenue | Allokation | Allocation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 p) |
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Series: | IGIER Working Paper ; No. 359 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 20, 2008 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1805030 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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