EXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE
We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
Year of publication: |
2005-05
|
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Authors: | Sinopoli, Francesco De ; Iannantuoni, Giovanna |
Institutions: | Departamento de EconomÃa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
Saved in:
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