Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games

We give a mechanism fully implementing envy-free divisions such that: strategy spaces are symmetric, the set of Nash equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. As a byproduct, undesired mixed-strategy equilibria are weeded out by the adjustment process

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Galbiati, Marco
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Neid \| Envy \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2008 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2008 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217517