Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?
Experience indicates that fiscal rules can be helpful as a disciplinary device at the central government level. This article explores whether fiscal rules could be usefully adopted in a decentralised framework, where the behaviour of subnational governments may undermine fiscal discipline.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Ter-Minassian, Teresa |
Published in: |
OECD Journal on Budgeting. - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE), ISSN 1681-2336. - Vol. 6.2006, 3, p. 1-11
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Publisher: |
Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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