FORMAL HOME HEALTH CARE, INFORMAL CARE, AND FAMILY DECISION MAKING
We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest. Copyright © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Byrne, David ; Goeree, Michelle S. ; Hiedemann, Bridget ; Stern, Steven |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 50.2009, 4, p. 1205-1242
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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