Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
We consider an infinitely-repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusive) contracting of future sales is more effective in deterring deviations from the collusive plan than in inducing the previously identified pro-competitive effects.
Year of publication: |
2005-03
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liski, Matti ; Montero, Juan-Pablo |
Institutions: | Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Sloan School of Management |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
Liski, Matti, (2004)
-
Forward Trading in Exhaustible-Resource Oligopoly
Liski, Matti, (2008)
-
A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking
Liski, Matti, (2004)
- More ...