From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik

We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the ShapleyŠShubik trading-post game.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Dubey, P. ; Geanakoplos, J.
Institutions:	Economics Department, State University of New York-Stony Brook (SUNY)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	11 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D41 - Perfect Competition
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005816340