Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Viossat, Yannick
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	best-reply dynamics \| replicator dynamics \| Nash equilibrium

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2014, Vol. 1, no. 3. pp. 537-553.Length: 16 pages
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171551