Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Takahashi, Satoru |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 71.2011, 1, p. 100-120
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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