Hostile versus Friendly Takeovers.
This paper analyzes the choice of a raider between a hostile and a friendly takeover. If the target company's manager has private information about the scope for efficiency gains, it is shown that the raider may prefer a hostile acquisition even if transaction costs for a friendly takeover are much smaller. The raider actually chooses between a (hostile) tender offer to uninformed shareholders and (friendly) merger negotiations with the informed manager. The author shows how the uncertainty about potential efficiency gains, the manager's preference for control, the number of shares held by the manager, and transaction costs affect the raider's choice. Copyright 1996 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Schnitzer, Monika |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 63.1996, 249, p. 37-55
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Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
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