How delegation improves commitment
McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Perino, Grischa |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 106.2010, 2, p. 137-139
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Time-inconsistency Commitment Delegation |
Saved in:
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