How robust is the folk theorem?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Hörner, Johannes ; Olszewski, Wojciech |
Published in: |
The quarterly journal of economics. - Oxford : Univ. Press, ISSN 0033-5533, ZDB-ID 3137-9. - Vol. 124.2009, 4, p. 1773-1814
|
Subject: | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Signalling | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory |
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