Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Kirstein, Roland |
Institutions: | Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
Subject: | Hierarchy | Imperfect Diagnosis | Monitoring | Incentives |
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